Abstract. In this work, after introduce the definition of fuzzy soft sets and their basic operations we define two person fuzzy soft games which can apply to problems contain vagueness and uncertainty. We then give four different types solution methods of the games which are fuzzy soft saddle points, fuzzy soft lower and upper values, fuzzy soft dominated strategies and fuzzy soft Nash equilibrium. We also give a probabilistic equilibrium solution method for the two persons fuzzy soft games (tp f s-games) which show that every finite tp f s-game with probabilistic strategies has one solution. Finally, we give an application which shows that the methods can be successfully applied to a financial problem and extended the two person fuzzy soft games to n-person fuzzy soft games.
Introduction
Soft set theory, was first introduced by Molodtsov [39] in 1999 for dealing with uncertain, not clearly defined objects. In [39] , Molodtsov gave applications of soft sets on some fields, such as Riemann-integration, probability, game theory, operations research and so on. Recently, works on soft set theory has been progressing rapidly and is finding applications in a wide variety of fields, for examples; theory of soft sets (e.g: [2, 11, 18, 35, 43] ), soft decision making (e.g: [12, 13, 22, 23, 27, 36] ), algebraic structures of soft sets (e.g: [1, 3, 26] ), soft topologies (e.g: [15, 37, 42, 44, 49] ), fuzzy soft sets (e.g: [16, 17] ), intuitionistic fuzzy soft sets (e.g: [24, 25, 33, 34, 38] ), neutrosophic parameterized soft set theory (e.g: [6, 20] ) and interval valued neutrosophic soft sets (e.g: [5, 7] ).
Game theory was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [40] in 1944 and then they started modern game theory. Game theory has successfully used in logic, decision making process, economics, political science, computer science and so on. In recent years, many interesting applications of game theory have been expanded by embedding the ideas of fuzzy sets (e.g. [9, 10, 28, 30, 31, 47] ). The game theory have also been expanded by using the ideas of interval data (e.g. [21, 29, 32] ). The linear programming problems with fuzzy parameters is introduced (e.g. [4, 8] ).
The notion of soft games is given by C . agman and Deli in [14] . In this work, we define a fuzzy soft game for dealing with uncertainties that is based on both soft sets and fuzzy sets. Therefore, payoff functions of the fuzzy soft game are set valued function and solution of the soft games obtained by using the operations of soft sets and fuzzy sets that make this game very convenient and easily applicable in practice. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the fundamental definition and most of operations of fuzzy soft sets are presented. In Section 3, we construct two person fuzzy soft games and then give four different solution methods for the games which are soft saddle points, soft lover and soft upper value, soft dominated strategies and soft Nash equilibrium. In section 4, we give a probabilistic equilibrium solution method for the two persons fuzzy soft games (tp f s-games). In section 5, we give an application for two person fuzzy soft games. In section 6, we give n-person fuzzy soft games that is extension of the two person fuzzy soft games. In final Section, we concluded the work.
The present expository paper is a condensation of part of the dissertation [19] .
Preliminary
In this section, we introduce the basic definitions of soft sets [11, 39] , fuzzy sets [48] and fuzzy soft sets [17] which are useful for subsequent discussions. More detailed explanations related to the soft sets, fuzzy sets and fuzzy soft sets can be found in [2, 11, 18, 35] , [48] and [16, 17] ), respectively.
Notion of the soft set theory is first given by Molodtsov [39] . Then the definition of soft set is modified by C . agman and Enginoglu [11] as follows.
Definition 2.1. [11] Let U be a universe, E be a set of parameters that are describe the elements of U, and A ⊆ E. Then, a soft set F A over U is a set defined by a set valued function f A representing a mapping
where f A is called approximate function of the soft set F A . Generally, f A , B , h C , ... will be used as an approximate functions of F A , G B , H C , ..., respectively. The value of approximate function f (x) may be arbitrary, some of them may be empty, some may have nonempty intersection.
It is noting that the soft set is a parametrized family of subsets of the set U, and therefore it can be written a set of ordered pairs
The subscript A in the f A indicates that f A is the approximate function of F A . Note that if f A (x) = ∅, then the element (x, f A (x)) is not appeared in F A .
Definition 2.2.
[48] Let U be the universe. A fuzzy set X over U is a set defined by a membership function µ X representing a mapping
The value µ X (x) for the fuzzy set X is called the membership value or the grade of membership of x ∈ U. The membership value represents the degree of x belonging to the fuzzy set X. Then a fuzzy set X on U can be represented as follows,
Definition 2.3. [17] Let U be an initial universe, F(U) be all fuzzy sets over U. E be the set of all parameters and A ⊆ E. An fuzzy soft set Γ A on the universe U is defined by the set of ordered pairs as follows,
is a fuzzy set over U.
The subscript A in the γ A indicates that γ A is the approximate function of Γ A . Note that if γ A (x) = ∅, then the element (x, γ A (x)) is not appeared in Γ A .
Example 2.4.
Suppose that U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } is the universe contains four house under consideration in an auto agent and E = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 } is the set of parameters, where x i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) stand for 'garden", "cheap", "modern" and "large", respectively. A customer to select a house from the real estate agent, can construct a fuzzy soft set Γ A that describes the characteristic of houses according to own requests. Assume that A = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 } ⊆ E and γ A (x 1 ) = {0.4/u 1 , 0.3/u 4 }, γ A (x 2 ) = {0.5/u 2 }, γ A (x 3 ) = ∅, γ A (x 4 ) = {0.2/u 1 , 0.8/u 2 } then the fuzzy soft-set Γ A is written by
By using same parameter set A, another customer to select a house from the same real estate agent, can construct a fuzzy soft setΓ A according to own requests. HereΓ A may be different then
Definition 2.5. [17] Let Γ A and Γ B be two fuzzy soft sets. Then, a) Complement of Γ A is denoted by Γ˜c A . Its approximate function γ Ac is defined by
Its fuzzy approximate function γ A ∪B is defined by 
Two Person Fuzzy Soft Games
In this section, we construct two person fuzzy soft games with fuzzy soft payoffs. We then give four solution methods for the fuzzy soft games. For basic definitions and preliminaries of the soft set, game and soft game theory we refer to [14, 18, [39] [40] [41] 45] .
In the soft game [14] , the strategy sets and the soft payoffs are crisp. But in fuzzy soft game, while the strategy sets are crisp, the fuzzy soft payoffs are fuzzy subsets of U. To avoid the confusion we will use Γ ,..., etc. for their fuzzy soft payoffs, respectively. In the following, some definition and results on game theory defined in [40, 41, 45] , we extend this definition to fuzzy soft game by using fuzzy soft set. Let U be a set of alternatives, F(U) be all fuzzy sets over U, E be a set of strategies, X, Y ⊆ E. Then, a set valued function
is called a fuzzy soft payoff function. For each (x, y) ∈ X × Y, the value γ X×Y (x, y) is called a fuzzy soft payoff.
Definition 3.3. Let X × Y be a set of action pairs. Then, an action (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is called an optimal action if 
, we says that a player strictly prefers action pair (x i , y j ) over action (x r , y s ), b) if γ X×Y (x i , y j ) = γ X×Y (x r , y s ), we says that a player is indifferent between the two actions, c) if γ X×Y (x i , y j ) ⊇ γ X×Y (x r , y s ), we says that a player either prefers (x i , y j ) to (x r , y s ) or is indifferent between the two actions.
Definition 3.5. Let γ k X×Y be a fuzzy soft payoff for Player k, (k = 1, 2), and (x i , y j ), (x r , y s ) ∈ X × Y. Then, Player k is called rational, if the player's fuzzy soft payoff satisfies the following conditions: : X × Y → F(U) be a fuzzy soft payoff function for player k, (k = 1, 2). Then, for each Player k, a two person fuzzy soft game (tp f s-game) is defined by a fuzzy soft set over U as
The tp f s-game is played as follows: at a certain time Player 1 chooses a strategy x i ∈ X, simultaneously Player 2 chooses a strategy y j ∈ Y and once this is done each player k (k=1,2) receives the fuzzy soft payoff γ
.., x m } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n }, then the fuzzy soft payoffs of Γ k X×Y can be arranged in the form of the m × n matrix shown in Table 1 . Now, we can give an example for tp f s-game.
Example 3.7. Let U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 5 , u 6 }be a set of alternatives, F(U) be all fuzzy sets over U, E = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 } be a set of strategies and X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 4 } and Y = {x 1 , x 2 } be a set of the strategies Player 1 and 2, respectively. If Player 1 constructs a tp f s-games as follows,
then the fuzzy soft payoffs of the game can be arranged as in Table 2 , Table 2 Let us explain some element of this game; if Player 1 select x 3 and Player 2 select x 2 , then the value of game will be a fuzzy soft payoff γ
In this case, Player 1 wins the set of alternatives {0.5/u 1 , 0.3/u 2 , 0.8/u 3 , 0.7/u 5 } and Player 2 lost the same set of alternatives.
Similarly, if Player 2 constructs a tp f s-game as follows,
then the fuzzy soft payoffs of the game can be arranged as in Table 3 , Table 3 Let us explain some element of this tp f s-game; if Player 1 select x 3 and Player 2 select x 2 , then the value of game will be fuzzy soft payoff γ . If the following properties hold
is called a fuzzy soft saddle point value and (x, y) is called a fuzzy soft saddle point of Player k's in the tp f s-game.
Note that if (x, y) is a fuzzy soft saddle point of a tp f s-game Γ 1 X×Y , then Player 1 can then win at least by choosing the strategy x ∈ X, and Player 2 can keep her/his loss to at most γ 1 X×Y (x, y) by choosing the strategy y ∈ Y. Hence the fuzzy soft saddle point is a value of the tp f s-game.
, u 10 } be a set of alternatives, X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 } be the strategies for Player 1 and 2, respectively. Then, tp f s-game of Player 1 is given as in Table 4 , Table 4 Clearly,
Therefore, {0.8/u 1 , 0.4/u 2 , 0.6/u 4 } is a fuzzy soft saddle point value of the tp f s-game, since the intersection of the forth row is equal to the union of the third column. So, the value of the tp f s-game is {0.8/u 1 , 0.4/u 2 , 0.6/u 4 }.
Note that every tp f s-game has not a fuzzy soft saddle point. (For instance, in the above example, if
, then a fuzzy soft saddle point of the game can not be found.) Saddle point can not be used for a tp f s-game, fuzzy soft upper and fuzzy soft lower values of the tp f s-game may be used is given in the following definition. 
ii. Fuzzy soft lower value of the tp f s-game, denoted v, is defined by
iii. If fuzzy soft upper and fuzzy soft lower value of a tp f s-game are equal, they are called value of the tp f s-game, noted by v. That is v = v = v. Proof: Assume that v be a fuzzy soft lower value, v be a fuzzy soft upper value of a tp f s-game and X = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n } are sets of the strategies for Player 1 and 2, respectively.
We choose x * i ∈ X and y * j ∈ Y. Then,
proof is valid. Proof: Assume that γ S k (x * , y * ) be a fuzzy soft saddle point value, v be a fuzzy soft lower value, v be a fuzzy soft upper value of a tp f s-game and X = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n } are sets of the strategies for Player 1 and 2, respectively.
We choose x * i ∈ X and y * j ∈ Y. Then, Since γ S k (x * , y * ) is a fuzzy soft saddle point value, we have
Clearly,
and
Then, from (1) and (2) eV L ⊆ γ X×Y (x, y) ⊆ eV U proof is valid. (x, y s ) for all x ∈ X By using fuzzy soft dominated strategy, tp f s-games may be reduced by deleting rows and columns that are obviously bad for the player who uses them. This process of eliminating fuzzy soft dominated strategies sometimes leads us to a solution of a tp f s-game. Such a method of solving tp f s-game is called a fuzzy soft elimination method.
The following tp f s-game can be solved by using the method.
Example 3.19. Let U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 5 , u 6 , u 7 , u 8 , u 9 , u 10 } be a set of alternatives, X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 } be the strategies for Player 1 and 2, respectively. Then, tp f s-game of Player 1 is given as in Table 5 ,
{0.8/u 1 , 0.4/u 2 , 0.6/u 4 } {0.9/u 1 , 0.6/u 2 , 0.6/u 3 , 0.9/u 4 , 0.5/u 5 }
{0.2/u 1 , 0.1/u 4 } {0.5/u 1 , 0.5/u 3 , 0.7/u 4 } Table 5 The last column is dominated by the first column. Deleting the last column we can obtain Table 6 as:
{0.2/u 1 , 0.1/u 4 } Table 6 Now, in Table 6 , the bottom and middle row is dominated by the top row. (Note that this is not the case in Table 5 ).
Deleting the bottom and middle row we obtain Table 7 as: The solution using the method is (x 1 , y 1 ), that is, value of the tp f s-game is {0.8/u 1 , 0.4/u 2 , 0.6/u 4 }.
Note that the fuzzy soft elimination method cannot be used for some tp f s-games which do not have a fuzzy soft dominated strategies. In this case, we can use fuzzy soft Nash equilibrium that is defined as follows. 
is called a fuzzy soft Nash equilibrium of a tp f s-game.
Note that if (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is a fuzzy soft Nash equilibrium of a tp f s-game, then Player 1 can then win at least γ 1 X×Y (x * , y * ) by choosing strategy x * ∈ X, and Player 2 can win at least γ 2 X×Y (x * , y * ) by choosing strategy y * ∈ Y. Hence the fuzzy soft Nash equilibrium is an optimal action for tp f s-game, therefore, γ k X×Y (x * , y * ) is the solution of the tp f s-game for Player k, k = 1, 2.
Following game, given in Example 3.21, can be solved by fuzzy soft Nash equilibrium, but it is very difficult to solve by using the others methods. Example 3.21. Let U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 5 , u 6 , u 7 , u 8 , u 9 , u 10 } be a set of alternatives, X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 } be the strategies Player 1 and 2, respectively. Then, tp f s-game of Player 1 is given as in Table 8 ,
{0.2/u 1 , 0.1/u 4 } {0.5/u 1 , 0.5/u 3 , 0.7/u 4 } Table 8 and tp f s-game of Player 2 is given as in Table 9 ,
{0.2/u 1 , 0.1/u 4 } {0.5/u 1 , 0.5/u 3 , 0.7/u 4 } Table 9 From the tables, we have [40] Let X be a set of strategies. A probabilistic choice function ρ X over X is defined by
Here, ρ X (x) is probability value for each x ∈ X. A set of probabilistic strategies ρ X over X can be represented as follows
Here, ρ X (x)/x is called probabilistic strategy for each x ∈ X.
Note that the subscript X in the ρ X indicates that ρ X is defined over X.
A solution method of tp f s-games
In this section, we give a probabilistic equilibrium solution method for the tp f s-games. In the following, some definition and results on game theory defined in [40, 41, 45] , we extend this definition to fuzzy soft game by using fuzzy soft set. 
.., x m } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n }, then the R Γ k can be presented by a table as in the following form ] m·n×k . Then, Proof: Assume that X = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n } be a set of strategies of Player 1 and 2, respectively. Choose x * i ∈ X and y * j ∈ Y; then, we have
Consequently, theorem is valid.
Definition 4.5. Let U be a set of alternatives, X and Y be two sets of strategies,
.., ρ Y (y n )/y n ) be a set of probabilistic strategies of Player 1 and 2, respectively, and γ k X×Y : X × Y → P(U) be a fuzzy soft payoff function for player k, (k = 1, 2). Then, for each Player k, a tp f s-game with probabilistic strategies is defined by
/y 3 } are sets of the probabilistic strategies for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If Player 1 constructs a tp f s-games as follows,
then the extended soft payoff matrix of Γ 1 X×Y over U for Player 1 as; .ρ Y (y j )] m·n×k are given, then we shall say that the tp f s-game with probabilistic strategies is in its bimatrix form. 
for Player 1 and 2, respectively. , is defined by Proof: Suppose that Γ k X×Y be a tp f s-game with its extended fuzzy soft payoff matrix [
.., ρ Y (y n )/y n ) be a set of probabilistic strategies of Player 1 and 2, respectively. If
then, we handle the x * i ∈ X and y * j ∈ Y strategies of Player 1 and 2, respectively.
Similarly, for every
Consequently, theorem is valid. 
Proof: Assume that U be a set of alternatives, ρ X and ρ Y are sets of the probabilistic strategies for Player 1 and 2, respectively. Then, we have eI 
consider the following inequations not implemented for (3)
from (3) we have
from (4) and (5) maxminv(x i , y j ) − I < 0 < minmaxv(x i , y j )) − I
and the last inequality added to each side I we have maxminv(x i , y j ) < I < minmaxv(x i , y j )
and then (7) is not true for every I. Therefore,
inequality is false. Here
is seen. Finally, from Theorem 4.12 and (9) maxminv(x i , y j ) = minmaxv(x i , y j ) (10) proof is provided
An Application
In this section, we give a financial problem that are solved by using both fuzzy soft dominated strategy and fuzzy soft saddle point methods. Now, we modified the application, given in [14] , by using fuzzy soft set as follows;
There are two companies, say Player 1 and Player 2, who competitively want to increase sale of produces in the country. Therefore, they give advertisements. Assume that two companies have a set of different products U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 5 , u 6 , u 7 , u 8 } where for i = 1, 2, ..., 8, the product u i stand for "oil", "salt",, "honey", " jam", " cheese", "sugar", "cooker", and "jar", respectively. The products can be characterized by a set of strategy E = {x i : i = 1, 2, 3} which contains styles of advertisement where for j = 1, 2, 3, the strategies x j stand for "TV", "radio" and " newspaper", respectively.
Suppose that X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and Y = {x 1 , x 2 } are strategies of Player 1 and 2, respectively. Then, a tp f s-game of Player 1 is given as in Table 10 . In Table 10 , let us explain action pair (x 1 , x 1 ); if Player 1 select x 1 = "TV" and Player 2 select x 1 = "TV", then the fuzzy soft payoff of Player 1 is a set {0.8/u 1 , 0.4/u 2 , 0.6/u 4 }, that is, γ We can now solve the game. It is seen in Table 10 , {0.8/u 1 , 0.4/u 2 , 0.6/u 4 } ⊆ {0.2/u 1 , 0.1/u 4 } {0.9/u 1 , 0.7/u 2 , 0.6/u 3 , 0.9/u 4 , 0.5/u 5 } ⊆ {0.5/u 1 , 0.5/u 3 , 0.7/u 4 } the bottom row is dominated by the top row. We then deleting the bottom row we obtain Table 11 .
{0.8/u 1 , 0.4/u 2 , 0.6/u 4 } {0.9/u 1 , 0.7/u 2 , 0.6/u 3 , 0.9/u 4 , 0.5/u 5 } x 2 {0.7/u 1 , 0.1/u 2 } {0.7/u 1 , 0.8/u 4 , 0.8/u 5 } Table 11 In Table 11 , there is no another fuzzy soft dominated strategy, we can use fuzzy soft saddle point method. Therefore, value of the tp f s-game is {0.8/u 1 , 0.4/u 2 , 0.6/u 4 }.
n-Person Soft Games
In many applications the fuzzy soft games can be often played between more than two players. Therefore, tp f s-games can be extended to n-person fuzzy soft games.
From now on, X , ..., x * n ) ∈ X × n is called a fuzzy soft Nash equilibrium of an nps-game.
Conclusion
In this paper, we first present the basic definitions and results of fuzzy soft set theory. We then construct tp f s-games with fuzzy soft payoffs which is set value and the solution operations based on the set operations. We also give four solution methods for the tp f s-games with examples. To applied the game to the real world problem we give an application which shows the methods can be successfully applied to a financial problem. Finally, we extended the two person fuzzy soft games to n-person fuzzy soft games. The fuzzy soft games may be applied to many fields and more comprehensive in the future to solve the related problems, such as; computer science, decision making, and so on.
